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Risk reduction and transaction costs are often used to explain contracting in the U.S. hog 
industry with little empirical support. Using a unified conceptual framework that draws 
from risk behavior and transaction cost theories, in combination with unique survey and 
accounting data, we demonstrate that risk preferences and asset specificity impact Illinois 
producers’ use of contracts and spot markets. In particular, producers’ investments in 
specific hog genetics and human capital are related to selection of long-term marketing 
contracts over spot markets. Producers who perceive greater levels of price risk and/or 
are more averse are more (less) likely to use contracts (spot markets). 
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Introduction 
 
Once dominated by spot exchanges, the U.S. hog industry has experienced more consolida-
tion and growth in contract use over the last decade than any other major commodity (Key, 
2004). However, vertical coordination, used by packers to secure specific hog genetics for 
branded pork products (Martinez, 2002), has taken a different path in traditional Midwest 
production regions than in areas of recent expansion (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995). 
Marketing contracts which may include cost-plus or price-window risk-sharing are more 
common in the feedstuff-abundant Midwest, while input-providing production contracts and 
vertical ownership are prevalent in the East.1 
 Rapid restructuring of the industry and growth in marketing arrangements have led to 
regulatory efforts at various levels of government (Reimer, 2006). However, a $4.5 million 
Congress-mandated study, motivated by concerns for efficient price discovery with lower 
quantities traded in spot markets, has found that observed marketing arrangements benefit not 
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1 The USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) recognizes two broad categories of contracts: marketing contracts which 
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particular production process (Key and McBride, 2003). 
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only packers but also producers and consumers (Vukina et al., 2007). In light of these bene-
fits, factors influencing producers’ use of marketing arrangements are of interest to policy 
makers, economists, and industry participants. 
 Previous research on the U.S. hog industry has offered either risk reduction (e.g., 
Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; Parcell and Langemeier, 1997) or transaction costs (e.g., 
Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000; Key and McBride, 2003; Reimer, 2006) explanations for 
marketing arrangements without explicit empirical evidence. In the only study to directly 
assess both explanations (Davis and Gillespie, 2007), key relationships were unsupported. 
Research on U.S. and Dutch hog industries has shown that producers’ preferences for price 
risk impact marketing arrangements but has neglected transaction costs (e.g., Zheng, Vukina, 
and Shin, 2008; Pennings and Smidts, 2000; Pennings and Wansink, 2004). 
 We compare risk behavior and transaction cost models with a more unified framework 
and demonstrate that risk preferences and asset specificity, a key transaction attribute, impact 
contract and spot market use. Unique survey and accounting data and the use of factor 
analysis (Hair et al., 1995) to develop reliable explanatory variables facilitate detection of 
significant effects. Personal interviews with producers in the Farm Business Farm Manage-
ment (FBFM) program at the University of Illinois supply enhanced measures of theoretical 
concepts like asset specificity (Macher and Richman, 2006), while FBFM records control for 
business characteristics such as size and leverage. Our sample focuses on marketing contracts 
which are prevalent in the Midwest, whereas prior research deals with production contracts 
and vertical ownership. 
 A major contribution is incorporation of risk behavior theory (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971) 
into transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975). Transaction cost economics and related 
efficiency-based frameworks, such as positive agency theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) 
and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986), are leading approaches in organiza-
tional economics. From this perspective, comparatively better organizational forms minimize 
the costs of organizing exchange and enforcing property rights which vary with the 
characteristics of the investments required and various types of uncertainty. However, as 
Robins (1987), Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990), and Chiles and McMackin (1996) suggest, 
the predictive power of these theories may be enhanced by allowing for heterogeneity in risk 
preferences.2 In particular, since producers hold varying perceptions and attitudes regarding 
risk, the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception should impact their marketing 
decisions (Pennings, Wansink, and Meulenberg, 2002; Pennings and Wansink, 2004). 
Whereas separate transaction cost and risk behavior approaches may omit relevant aspects of 
the choice among marketing arrangements, a more unified approach allows us to weigh their 
relative importance in explaining marketing behavior and offers insight into how producers 
respond to increasing pressures for vertical coordination. 
 
Transaction Cost and Risk Behavior Theories 
 
Transaction cost economics, positive agency theory, and property rights theory grew from 
Coase’s (1937) insight that transaction costs render the adopted organizational form and the 
initial assignment of property rights relevant for efficient outcomes. There has been substan-
tial progress toward joining these positive transaction cost theories (e.g., Mahoney, 1992; 
                                                 
2 Transaction cost economics assumes exchange between risk-neutral principals and agents, while agency theories assume a risk-averse 
agent (Mahoney and McNally, 2004). 
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Kim and Mahoney, 2005) with the central notion that adopted organizational forms minimize 
transaction costs. As these costs are not easily measured (Klein, Frazier, and Roth, 1990), 
researchers typically test for the predicted alignment of organizational forms with transaction 
attributes—asset specificity and uncertainty. 
 Asset specificity is an asset’s degree of specialization toward an exchange relationship 
(Lajili et al., 1997). Williamson (1985) categorizes specific assets as physical (specialized 
tools or equipment), human (firm-specific knowledge), or site (e.g., co-location of a coal-fired 
electric plant and a coal mine). Investments in these assets have lower (salvage) value outside 
of the relationship, and the difference in value, a quasi-rent, is subject to threat of approp-
riation via superior bargaining power if not properly safeguarded (Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian, 1978). Long-term contracts can sufficiently protect quasi-rents at intermediate levels 
of asset specificity (Joskow, 1987), but vertical ownership is necessary at extreme levels of 
asset specificity (Mahoney, 2005). 
 Reviews of empirical transaction cost studies (e.g., Mahoney, 1992; David and Han, 2004) 
reveal that most types of uncertainty encourage tighter coordination of marketing channels. 
Contracts and vertical ownership of the marketing channel may limit exposure to environ-
mental uncertainty (i.e., supply, demand, price, and revenue uncertainty) and may counteract 
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., performance ambiguity in positive agency theory) by facilitating 
performance evaluation (Mahoney, 1992). When outcome measurement is difficult, agents’ 
actions may be monitored if task programmability is high, meaning that managers can specify 
the steps of the contracted task in advance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
 The above discussion reveals that market governance is efficient only under sufficiently 
low uncertainty and asset specificity (Mahoney, 1992; Mahoney and McNally, 2004). The 
following hypotheses relate the transaction attributes to the organizational forms investigated 
here, long-term marketing contracts and spot markets: 
 
  ■ H1 . Greater uncertainty is associated with greater use of contracts and less use   
  of spot markets. 
 
  ■ H2 . Greater asset specificity is associated with greater use of contracts and less  
  use of spot markets. 
 
While uncertainty contributes to marketing arrangements in the above-reviewed theories, 
these theories do not explicitly address individuals’ awareness (i.e., perceptions) of and 
attitudes toward risk. Pennings, Wansink, and Meulenberg (2002) show that the Pratt (1964) 
and Arrow (1971) framework implies risk management is a function of the interaction 
between risk attitude and risk perception (IRAP). Based on this finding, in a marketing 
channel context, Pennings and Wansink (2004, p. 699) conjecture: 
 
We do not expect risk attitude and risk perception to individually have a direct impact on the 
contract strategies employed by channel members. Instead … it is the combination of risk 
attitude and risk perception that influences behavior. After all, regardless of one’s individual 
risk attitudes a channel member will not change his or her behavior if no risk is perceived in a 
given situation. 
 
In this framework (figure 1), IRAP is positive when market participants perceive risk and are 
risk averse, negative when they perceive risk and are risk seeking, and zero when they either 
don’t perceive any risk or are risk neutral. We offer the following hypothesis.  
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    Note: Adapted from Pennings and Wansink (2004). 
 
   Figure 1. Influence of the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception 
   on adoption of marketing arrangements 
 
 ■ H3 . Greater IRAP values are associated with greater use of contracts and less use  
  of spot markets. 
 
Viewing price risk as environmental uncertainty, hypothesis H3 is a refinement of transaction 
cost hypothesis H1 with uncertainty replaced by IRAP.3 This perspective offers a more com-
plete treatment of managerial choice by explicitly incorporating risk preferences. Replacing 
hypothesis H1 in the transaction cost framework by hypothesis H3 yields a more unified 
framework that may offer more comprehensive understanding of marketing arrangements.4 
 
Review of Hog Industry Research 
 
Research on the U.S. hog industry has offered limited empirical evidence for risk reduction 
and transaction costs explanations of marketing arrangements. Cozzarin and Westgren (2000) 
and Reimer (2006) simulated marketing arrangements, while Key and McBride (2003), Davis 
and Gillespie (2007), and Zheng, Vukina, and Shin (2008) examined producer behavior using 
survey data. Simulation results did not support positive agency theory but were consistent 
with property rights theory providing indirect evidence that transaction costs matter. 
 Key and McBride (2003) used USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS) data to gain insight on factors affecting actual contract use. Their findings were 
consistent with processors minimizing transaction costs by contracting with fewer and larger 
farms. However, they found no support for the notion that production contracts enhance 
producers’ ability to obtain debt financing. Since inputs are provided under these contracts, 
they argued that producers’ costs are lower, and their resources can be used to finance expan-
sion. Also using ARMS data, Zheng, Vukina, and Shin (2008) showed that producers using 
                                                 
3 Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk (randomness with knowable probabilities) versus uncertainty (randomness with unknowable 
probabilities) parallels transaction cost theory’s distinction between uncertainty versus uncertainty plus complexity compounded by bounded 
rationality. 
4 As is common in transaction cost and risk behavior analyses (cf., Mahoney, 1992; Pennings and Wansink, 2004), we control for business 
characteristics such as size and leverage and the age and education of management in the empirical analysis, but do not formalize their 
influences in the conceptual model. Such steps are beyond the scope of combining transaction cost and risk behavior paradigms, which only 
entails simultaneous consideration of the efficiency implications of specific investments and the behavioral implications of heterogeneous 
risk preferences. 
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production contracts are more risk averse than a category of producers using marketing 
contracts or spot sales and quantified their welfare loss under a hypothetical regulatory ban of 
production contracts. Using a national survey, Davis and Gillespie (2007) explained use of 
spot markets, cooperatives, and flat-fee and incentive-based production contracts. Results 
were consistent with independent producers managing risk via diversified agricultural 
production and smaller producers reducing risk with flat-fee contracts. They argued that the 
counterintuitive negative relationship between size and contract use is plausible if contracts 
are mostly between farmers when the grower has empty facilities and the contractor wishes to 
expand. Davis and Gillespie also examined whether marketing arrangements can be explained 
by producer specialization in the stages of hog production, which they argued reflects task 
programmability in positive agency theory, but found no empirical support. Likewise, their 
measure of risk attitude lacked statistical significance for any marketing arrangement. 
 Consistent with Zheng, Vukina, and Shin’s (2008) findings for the United States, studies 
of the Dutch hog industry also suggest risk preferences matter. Pennings and Smidts (2000) 
found that use of futures contracts and average price sales through cooperatives were 
significantly more likely as Dutch hog producers became risk averse. Both alternatives entail 
less risk than spot market sales. Pennings and Wansink (2004) showed that use of spot 
transactions and fixed-price contracts by Dutch hog producers, wholesalers, and processors 
can be explained partly by the interaction of risk attitudes and risk perception (IRAP), their 
bargaining power, and market structure. Market participants with positive IRAP scores (risk 
averse) bought and sold using fixed-price contracts in markets without natural hedges and 
spot transactions when natural hedges existed. Market participants with negative IRAP scores 
(risk seeking) bought and sold using spot transactions in markets without natural hedges, 
while they used contracts on either the buying or selling side and spot transactions on the 
other when natural hedges existed. 
 
Research Design 
 
To examine the proposed relationships, a unique data set was assembled by surveying a 
sample of hog producers, for which annual accounting and production records are maintained 
through the University of Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) Extension 
program. FBFM is a cooperative educational service available to all agricultural producers in 
the state of Illinois for a fee (Lattz, Cagley, and Raab, 2005). Presently, about one out of five 
Illinois commercial farms with over 500 acres or over $100,000 total farm sales participate. 
The program is designed to assist producers with management decisions by providing busi-
ness analysis through computer-assisted processing of records for income tax management. 
Secondary production and accounting data are collected annually by 58 full-time field staff 
specialists serving nine FBFM associations or regions. The resulting data set provides 
extensive information on the cost and debt structure of the farm operations, as well as the 
source of revenues (i.e., grain or livestock production). 
 Contact information on all hog producers in the FBFM database was obtained from field 
staff. All 103 hog producers were offered a chance at one of ten $100 lottery prizes as 
encouragement for their participation in the 2006 survey. Four rounds of pre-tests—two with 
FBFM personnel and two with producers—were performed. In each case, survey items were 
modified, eliminated, or added based on comments. Personal interviews, averaging one hour 
and twenty minutes, limited the sample size but enhanced the reliability of responses. In total, 
50 producers participated. The responses of two producers were not included in the analysis 
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due to incomplete accounting data. The focus of the study is on marketing contracts which are 
common in traditional Midwest production regions. None of our 48 farmers use production 
contracts which are prevalent in regions of more recent expansion in hog production. 
 Consistent with prior hog contracting studies (e.g., Key and McBride, 2003; Pennings and 
Wansink, 2004) and with the larger empirical literature on transaction cost economics (David 
and Han, 2004), binary dependent variables are coded based on whether producers used 
primarily marketing contracts or spot transactions. CONTRACT equals one if greater than 
50% of production is sold using long-term marketing contracts, and equals zero otherwise. 
SPOT equals one if greater than 50% of production is sold at spot prices, and equals zero 
otherwise—meaning that the majority of production could be sold using any combination of 
long- and short-term contracts. CONTRACT and SPOT are not mirror images due to the 
treatment of short-term contracts (i.e., futures, options, and forward contracts). Use of short-
term contracts resides in the zero category of both variables. Thus, CONTRACT distinguishes 
producers using long-term contracts from others, and SPOT distinguishes producers exposed 
to spot price risk from others. This treatment allows us to assess the nature of risk reduction 
via short- and long-term contracts, which has not been addressed previously. Risk prefer-
ences, as measured by IRAP, should be more relevant for SPOT than for CONTRACT, as 
long-term contracts guarantee only that prices received will not fall below a specified level 
while short-term contracts lock in a price or basis. 
 In our sample, four producers have verbal commitments to deliver their hogs, and 14 
producers are members of cooperatives. As is convention in transaction cost economics, we 
include only written, legally binding agreements in the contracting category (Masten and 
Saussier, 2002). Since members of a cooperative are subject to immediate spot price risk, 
these producers are not included in the contracting category. This treatment is consistent 
with Davis and Gillespie’s (2007) results that independent producers significantly differ 
from cooperative producers only in that they are older and value autonomy more. Empirical 
results are reported for the full sample, but a subsample of producers using only spot markets 
and written marketing contracts yields similar results for the risk and transaction cost 
variables. 
 Secondary accounting data provide measures of farms’ size and leverage, while primary 
survey data capture producers’ age and education and whether they specialize in particular 
stages of the hog production process (table 1). Most of these measures are straightforward. 
While previous studies measure LEVERAGE by the debt-to-asset ratio, we employ the capital 
replacement and term debt repayment margin, which should be a better measure (cf., Farm 
Financial Standards Council, 1997). Higher values of this statistic indicate greater capacity to 
replace capital assets, repay debt, and service additional debt. Summary statistics are dis-
cussed in the empirical results section. 
 Measures of risk perceptions, risk attitudes, and asset specificity are computed from 
producers’ responses to scaled survey items in table 2. Validated risk perception and risk 
attitude items are adopted from Pennings and Wansink (2004) and Pennings and Garcia 
(2001), respectively. These items are used in the construction of the IRAP variable. Since 
price risk is indicative of supply and demand uncertainty, risk perception items appropriately 
proxy for uncertainty in the transaction cost framework, assuming hog producers are 
boundedly rational and predicting hog prices is complex. Asset specificity items are designed 
to reflect the human, physical, and site categories identified by Williamson (1985), and the 
characteristics of the hog industry. These measures, many of which have been employed in 
prior research, correspond closely to the theoretical concepts.  
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Table 1. Definitions of Directly Measured Variables, 2006 Data (N = 48 observations) 
 
Variables 
 
Definition 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Continuous Variables:    
SIZE Thousands of hogs sold in 2006 30.68 0.21 5.03 
(5.50) 
LEVERAGE Capital replacement and term debt repayment 
margin ($1,000s), which at higher values 
indicates greater capacity to replace capital 
assets, repay debt, and service additional debt 
(Farm Financial Standards Council, 1997); 
LEVERAGE = net income from operations + 
total nonfarm income + depreciation expense 
+ interest on term debt and capital leases – 
total income taxes – family living withdrawal 
3.74×102 −2.29×103 −6.39×101 
(3.64×102) 
AGE Producer’s age in years 72.00 31.00 52.71 
(8.57) 
  Frequency  
Binary Variables: Ones Zeroes  
CONTRACT = 1 if greater than 50% of production is sold 
using marketing contracts; = 0 otherwise 
13 35  
SPOT = 1 if greater than 50% of production is sold 
at spot prices; = 0 otherwise 
31 17  
EDUCATION = 1 if the producer has completed four or 
more years of college; = 0 otherwise 
18 30  
STAGE = 1 if the producer operates only one of the 
three stages of hog production; = 0 otherwise 
5 43  
 
 
 An aspect of using specific investments that could be viewed as a serious issue is an 
apparent fixed relationship with contract use. For instance, if contract terms specify equip-
ment or genetics, then contract use will mirror asset use perfectly. In this context, item 
Physical5, which reflects producer investments in specific hog genetics, appears particularly 
problematic as specific hog genetics are a fundamental dimension of production contracts in 
other regions. However, our interviews suggest a different dynamic for the marketing 
contracts commonly used in the Midwest. Desired breeds (basically white hogs), which can 
be a prerequisite for contracting, are raised not only by contract producers but also by several 
independent producers as a means of increasing their current and subsequent marketing 
options. Use of specific genetics (e.g., particular boar semen) is not typically written into a 
contract, but does appear to emerge after a contract has been initiated. At this point, producers 
are more willing to “heed” the advice of buyers. Furthermore, producers with verbal agree-
ments (who are not formally classified as contracting in this study) also at times follow the 
advice of buyers on which boars to use. Hence, the relationship between specific genetics and 
marketing contracts is more fluid and less fixed than for production contracts that are more 
common in other regions.  
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Table 2. Risk Perception, Risk Attitude, and Asset Specificity Survey Items 
Risk Perception Items:  
RP1 How risky do you consider market prices for hogs? 
RP2 How risky do you consider selling your hogs in cash markets? 
RP3 How do you rate market prices for (weaner, feeder, finished) hogs in terms of financial risk they 
pose to your farm income? 
RP4 I see large fluctuations in hog prices that expose me to risk. 
RP5 Hog prices possibly could fall below my cost of production, and hence expose me to risk. 
RP6 I can predict hog prices. 
RP7 The cash hog market is not risky at all. 
Risk Attitude Items: 
RA1 I usually like “playing it safe” (for instance, “locking in a price”) instead of taking risks for market 
prices for (weaner, feader, finished) hogs. 
RA2 When selling/marketing my hogs, I prefer financial certainty to financial uncertainty. 
RA3 When selling/marketing my hogs, I am willing to take higher financial risks in order to realize 
higher average returns. 
RA4 I like taking financial risks with my hog farm business. 
RA5 I accept more risk in my hog farm than other hog farmers. 
RA6 With respect to the conduct of business, I dislike risk. 
Asset Specificity Items: 
Human1 I have learned about production methods that my primary buyer wants me to use, and this 
knowledge is of little value if I deliver to a different buyer. 
Human2 The relationship with my primary buyer has become valuable in terms of the experience/knowledge 
that we share regarding each other’s practices and needs. 
Human3 Experience (information) regarding each other’s practices and needs is an aspect of the relationship 
with my primary buyer that I value. 
Human4 Experience (information) regarding each other’s practices and needs is an aspect of our relationship 
that my primary buyer likely values. 
Human5 My primary buyer considers my understanding of its input needs and/or operating/trade procedures 
key to our relationship. 
Physical1 I could not recover the full value of my investments in specialized equipment and/or facilities if the 
relationship with my primary buyer ended. 
Physical2 My production system has been tailored to meet the requirements of dealing with my primary 
buyer. 
Physical3 I’ve made significant investments in equipment and/or facilities dedicated to the relationship with 
my primary buyer. 
Physical4 I own equipment and/or facilities that were required by my primary buyer. 
Physical5 My primary buyer requires me to use specific genetics or blood lines. 
Site1 My primary buyer likely values the close location of my production operations for timely delivery 
of hogs. 
Site2 My primary buyer sources its hogs from a particular region. 
Site3 The nearness of my production operations to my primary buyer’s location is beneficial to me. 
Site4 The distance I must travel to deliver my product (transportation costs) plays a role in  
my choice of a primary buyer. 
Site5 The number of nearby buyers impacts my choice of a primary buyer. 
 
Notes: Risk perception items 1–3 scaled as follows: 1 = “not at all risky” and 9 = “very risky.” Risk perception items 4–7, risk 
attitude items, and asset specificity items scaled as follows: 1 = “strongly disagree” and 9 = “strongly agree.” Risk perception and 
risk attitude items adopted from Pennings and Wansink (2004) and Pennings and Garcia (2001), respectively. Human asset 
specificity items reflect Anderson’s (1985, 1988) focus on the value of experience with trade partners. Physical asset specificity 
items 2 and 3 adopted from Heide and John (1992). All other items were developed specifically for this study.  
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Empirical Methods 
 
Measures for risk behavior and transaction cost variables are constructed from survey items 
using factor analysis, since these theoretical concepts are observable only indirectly (Hair et 
al., 1995). Relationships between relevant survey items are summarized as a smaller set of 
more parsimonious variables (eigenvectors called factors) that conserve degrees of freedom 
and improve power against type II errors in subsequent logit analyses (Thompson, 2004). 
Factor analysis is performed in SPSS and AMOS. All other analyses are performed in 
STATA. 
 Though organizational research deals with the extent of vertical integration along a 
continuum from spot transactions to complete vertical ownership, much of the research 
investigates more dichotomous questions (e.g., y = 1 if contract; y = 0 otherwise). Binomial 
logit procedures estimate the probability Pr(y = 1│x) = (ex´β) / (1 + ex´β) = F(x´β), where x and 
β are vectors of explanatory variables and coefficients, respectively, and F(·) is the logistic 
cumulative distribution function. Both Sykuta (2005) and Hoetker (2007) summarize best 
practices for logit models which are followed here. 
 While statistical significance usually can be inferred directly from coefficient test 
statistics, the economic significance (or marginal effect) of an explanatory variable depends 
on the values of the other explanatory variables (Hoetker, 2007). Unless particular values are 
of interest, marginal effects are often computed at the mean. We report the average of 
marginal effects computed for each observation, since no observation is likely to have mean 
values for all variables. These average marginal effects can differ from those computed at the 
mean by a factor of three (Hoetker) but are very similar for our data. The marginal effects of 
continuous variables are ∂F(·)/∂x = F(·)[1 − F(·)]β, and the marginal effect of a dummy 
variable is the change in the expected probability when the dummy changes from zero to one, 
evaluated at specified values of the other explanatory variables (Sykuta, 2005). The standard 
error of the marginal effect is computed as the square root of the variance of the marginal 
effect (G × V(β) × G′)0.5 using the delta method (cf., Greene, 2003, p. 674), where G contains 
the derivatives of marginal effects with respect to parameter estimates and V(β) is the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates. 
 As Hoetker (2007) notes, several pseudo-R2 measures exist for logit models, none of 
which equate directly to R2 in ordinary least squares regressions. A model’s proportion of 
correct predictions can also be misleading, since a naïve model always predicts at least 50% 
correctly. Hence, McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-R2 and the proportion correctly predicted by the 
naïve model also are reported for comparison with each model’s proportion of correct 
predictions in our analysis. Additionally, nonnested J-tests are performed to gain insight into 
the relative performance of the models (cf., Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981). 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Factor Analysis 
 
Following the conventional “K1” rule, we identify notable factors possessing characteristic 
roots (eigenvalues) greater than one (Thompson, 2004). Such factors consist of survey items 
with high factor loadings and explain the majority of common variance. Our measures are 
reliable, as indicated by Cronbach’s (1951) alphas greater than 0.70 (table 3), and we find 
little difference between using original and standardized items (zero mean, unit variance). 
Hence, the factors employed in logit regressions are computed from the original items. 
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Table 3. Construct Reliability and Summary Statistics, 2006 Data (N = 48 observations) 
Bootstrapped Factors Survey Items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Mean  
(Std.Dev.)  
RISK PERCEPTION RP1–RP5, RP7 0.777 8.40 2.62 5.70 
(1.34) 
RISK ATTITUDE RA1–RA6 0.785 3.73 −3.88 0.27 
(1.73) 
IRAP        — — 24.32 −30.84 1.65 
(11.28) 
HUMAN ASSET SPECIFICITY HU1–HU5 0.897 4.17 0.69 2.67 
(1.06) 
SITE ASSET SPECIFICITY SI1–SI5 0.845 6.06 0.73 3.77 
(1.36) 
PHYSICAL ASSET SPECIFICITY PH1–PH4 0.902 7.27 0.90 2.19 
(1.31) 
SPECIFIC GENETICS PH5 — 9.00 1.00 3.28 
(2.64) 
Notes: RP, RA, HU, PH, and SI, respectively, denote risk perception, risk attitude, and human, physical, and site asset specificity 
items identified in table 2. The items were reverse-coded when appropriate. IRAP is the product of RISK PERCEPTION and 
RISK ATTITUDE factors. 
 
 In most cases, all of the items in a particular rubric entered into the respective factors. A 
notable exception was the fifth physical asset specificity item (PH5) which reflects invest-
ments in specific hog genetics. This item loaded nearly evenly on HUMAN and PHYSICAL 
factors. To preserve the unidimensionality of these factors, the hog genetics item was 
excluded from their computations but was examined separately in the subsequent logit 
analysis to reflect the importance of genetics in the hog industry. IRAP was computed as the 
product of RISK ATTITUDE and RISK PERCEPTION factors. 
 
Sample Statistics and Representativeness 
 
With much of the growth in large hog production operations occurring outside of traditional 
Midwest production regions, the representativeness of our relatively small sample of Illinois 
hog producers must be established. Illinois ranks fourth among U.S. states in terms of total 
hogs and pigs on inventory, with about 4.35 million head in 2008 (USDA/NASS, “Hogs and 
Pigs”). According to FBFM Extension specialists, “the data from recordkeeping farms may be 
used with reasonable confidence, even though the recordkeeping farms as a group do not 
represent a cross section of all commercial farms in the state” (Lattz, Cagley, and Raab, 2005, 
p. 1). 
 The distribution of surveyed hog farms across sales is consistent with the USDA’s 2007 
Census of Agriculture numbers for Illinois hog farms of 200 to 1,999 head, but under-
represents smaller farms and somewhat overrepresents larger farms (figure 2). There is little 
difference between FBFM producers who chose to participate in this study and those who did 
not. In both cases, about 33% of the producers sell more than 5,000 hogs annually. Similarly, 
the USDA ARMS data used in other hog marketing studies (e.g., Key and McBride, 2003) 
underrepresent the proportion of small hog farms in USDA Census data, which partly reflects 
a process of screening noncommercial production from the ARMS data set (cf., Key and
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       Notes: Sales data on Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) Association members are for 2006;  
       Illinois and U.S. data are from the USDA’s 2007 Census of Agriculture. 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of farms by inventories and sales, 2006 and 2007 
 
McBride, 2007).5 Our sample is also comparable to other producers in terms of average costs 
of production. USDA 2006 estimates for total operating costs of $44.73/cwt and $41.81/cwt 
in the United States and the Heartland are similar to the value of $41.89/cwt for surveyed 
FBFM producers. 
 Summary statistics also substantiate the representativeness of our sample and suggest 
substantial variation for the explanatory variables (tables 1 and 3). The average producer is 
approximately 53 years old, sells about 5,000 hogs annually, and is highly leveraged as 
indicated by a negative mean capital replacement and term debt repayment margin. Similarly, 
the average age of producers in the ARMS data set is 51 (Zheng, Vukina, and Shin, 2008). 
About half of the producers in the ARMS data set have completed some college. Eighteen of 
the surveyed FBFM producers possess a bachelor of science degree. Only five producers in 
our sample specialize in one stage of hog production. Such specialization is more common 
outside the Midwest (Davis and Gillespie, 2007). On average, FBFM producers perceive 
considerable environmental risk and are slightly risk averse, while they somewhat disagree 
with survey items stating that their investments are specialized (table 3). Producers using 
marketing contracts generally agree with these statements more. 
 Correlations are presented in table 4. First, observe that CONTRACT and SPOT are nearly 
inverses except for slight deviation due to futures and options or forward contract usage. 
These dependent variables have less correlation with the risk perception factor than with the 
risk attitude factor and IRAP. SIZE and various measures of asset specificity exhibit moderate
                                                 
5 As a caveat, representativeness in terms of the number of farms distributed across size categories may not equate to a good representation 
of how the majority of hogs produced are marketed. That is, one large farm will sell as many hogs as several small farms combined. 
Furthermore, how our sample compares to the U.S. hog industry in the greater than 5,000 hogs sold segment is difficult to say. Our sample 
does not represent the large production contract operations prominent outside the Midwest. Prior research suggests Midwest farms are more 
diversified in terms of commodities produced, and thus less likely to use production contracts (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995; Davis and 
Gillespie, 2007). In this respect, our sample is more representative of Midwest farms and Illinois farms in particular, as all but one of the 
producers in our sample also raise corn and soybeans, and 10 of the producers also raise cattle. 
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correlation with the dependent variables. The largest of these correlations is for the fifth 
physical asset specificity item (Physical5) which reflects investments in specific hog genetics. 
Interestingly, genetic (and human) asset specificity and IRAP exhibit similar levels of 
correlation with the dependent variables, suggesting that contract producers who make 
specific investments are also risk averse. 
 
Regression Results 
 
Logit results for transaction cost, risk behavior, and unified frameworks are presented in table 
5. Here, asset specificity is represented in both the transaction cost and unified models by the 
survey item reflecting investments in specific hog genetics. The human asset specificity factor 
behaves similarly but exhibits lower (higher) statistical significance in CONTRACT (SPOT) 
regressions, while physical and site asset specificity factors are insignificant. In the trans-
action cost model, UNCERTAINTY is measured by the risk perception factor. 
 For each logit regression, the findings for business characteristics corroborate prior 
research, lending credence to our treatment of cooperative producers and producers with 
verbal commitments as spot market participants. As in Key and McBride (2003), larger farms 
are more likely to contract. Average marginal effects for SIZE suggest that the probability of 
using long-term contracts increases and the probability of using spot markets decreases 
around 2% to 3% for every additional 1,000 hogs sold. While Key and McBride find no link 
between production contracts and producers’ access to external debt, Davis and Gillespie 
(2007) suggest that their own results reflect less debt borne under these input-providing 
contracts than under independent production. Here, greater capacity to repay debt, as reflected 
by higher values of LEVERAGE, is associated with less contracting and greater spot market 
use. Consistent with Davis and Gillespie’s expectations for age and Key and McBride’s 
findings for experience, we find that older (more experienced) producers are more likely to 
use spot markets than long-term contracts. Although the sign on EDUCATION is consistent 
with results reported by Key and McBride, it is statistically significant only in the risk 
behavior model for SPOT.6  
 With regard to the question posed in our title, the findings provide direct empirical support 
for asset specificity and risk preferences as predictors of hog marketing arrangements adopted 
by producers in our sample. Since the factor measures of these latent variables are comprised 
of several survey items of the same scale, their marginal effects may be interpreted in the 
same manner as any other variable and may be readily compared across factors. However, 
comparing the marginal effects of factors and hard data is less straightforward, as the 
marginal effects of all variables change with scaling, and survey scale items cannot be readily 
translated to standard metrics used for hard data (e.g., number of hogs sold). Hence, the 
statistical significance of these factors is given more attention here than the magnitude of their 
influence. Though UNCERTAINTY as measured by the risk perception factor in the 
transaction cost model offers no statistically significant support for hypothesis H1, SPECIFIC 
GENETICS provides stronger support for hypothesis H2. Strong statistically significant 
support also is obtained for hypothesis H3, as average marginal effects indicate that a unit 
increase in IRAP increases the probability of using long-term contracts and decreases the 
probability of using spot markets by about 1%. Consistent with Davis and Gillespie (2007), 
 
                                                 
6 Assuming cooperative and independent producers are similar, the sign on EDUCATION is also consistent with Davis and Gillespie’s 
(2007) finding of a significantly negative impact of education on the use of long-term contracts relative to cooperatives. 
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Table 5. Marginal Effects for Logit Models of Marketing Arrangements (N = 48  
observations) 
  Transaction Cost Model     Risk Behavior Model      Unified Framework 
Marginal Effect CONTRACT    SPOT CONTRACT     SPOT CONTRACT    SPOT 
SIZE 0.0178 −0.0303** 0.0278** −0.0349*** 0.0185 −0.0299** 
 (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0118) 
LEVERAGE −0.0007*** 0.0008*** −0.0007** 0.0008*** −0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
AGE −0.0141*** 0.0268*** −0.0132** 0.0233*** −0.0127** 0.0228*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0060) 
EDUCATION −0.1025 0.1502 −0.1426 0.1621* −0.1108 0.1486 
 (0.0983) (0.1034) (0.0966) (0.1002) (0.0981) (0.0991) 
UNCERTAINTY 0.0213 −0.0526 —       —        —      — 
 (0.0508) (0.0466)     
IRAP —      — 0.0117** −0.0129*** 0.0059 −0.0108** 
   (0.0055) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0054) 
SPECIFIC GENETICS 0.0599*** −0.0345* —       — 0.0515*** −0.0234 
 (0.0132) (0.0177)   (0.0140) (0.0181) 
McFadden’s R2 0.4208 0.4028 0.2898 0.4158 0.4355 0.4401 
% Correctly Predicted         90       81         81       88         90       85 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*, **, ***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Values in parentheses are standard errors; 73% (65%) of observations for CONTRACT (SPOT) are correctly predicted by naïve 
models. 
 
STAGE provided no significant support for positive agency theory’s task programmability 
concept in unreported results. 
 Notice that the moderately correlated risk and transaction cost variables (table 4) vie for 
significance in the unified model (table 5). Inclusion of IRAP in SPOT regressions erodes the 
significance of SPECIFIC GENETICS, relative to the results for the transaction cost model. 
Conversely, IRAP loses significance with the inclusion of SPECIFIC GENETICS in 
CONTRACT regressions, relative to the risk behavior model. These findings suggest that 
relatively risk-averse producers accept processors’ contracts supporting specific investments, 
which contributes to the difficulty in disentangling their effects. In SPOT regressions, the 
relatively lower significance of asset specificity variables and the higher significance of IRAP 
may also reflect use of futures, options, and forward contracts, which entail no asset 
specificity but mitigate risk. Overall, the results support hypotheses H2 and H3, underscoring 
the importance of asset specificity and risk behavior. 
 In terms of both McFadden’s R2 and the proportion of observations correctly predicted, 
the transaction cost model outperforms the risk behavior model for CONTRACT regressions 
while the reverse is true for SPOT regressions. The unified framework offers the highest 
predictive power for CONTRACT (the same level as the transaction cost model) but not for 
SPOT. Closer inspection reveals that for every observation of SPOT where the risk behavior 
model outpredicts the unified framework, predicted probabilities were very close but on 
opposite sides of the 50% cutoff value for a prediction of one. 
 To assess the robustness of our findings, we also estimate the relationships using a two-
limit tobit analysis of truncated continuous dependent variables characterizing the percentage
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Table 6. Results of Nonnested Model Specification Tests (N = 48 observations) 
Models w/Binary Dependent Variables  CONTRACT  SPOT 
  Base Model       Alternative Model  z-Statistic p-Value  z-Statistic p-Value 
RISK model  TCE model  2.66 0.01  0.72  0.47 
TCE model  RISK model  1.07 0.29  2.43 0.015 
UNIFIED model  TCE model  1.65 0.10      −0.08  0.94 
TCE model  UNIFIED model  1.68 0.09  1.48  0.14 
Models w/Continuous Dependent Variables  CONTRACT  SPOT 
  Base Model       Alternative Model  t-Statistic p-Value  t-Statistic p-Value 
RISK model  TCE model  2.38 0.02  2.16 0.04 
TCE model  RISK model  1.12 0.27  2.70 0.01 
UNIFIED model  TCE model  0.44 0.67  0.20 0.84 
TCE model  UNIFIED model  1.12 0.27  2.70 0.01 
Note: Statistically significant test statistics warrant rejection of the base model due to significant additional information provided 
by the alternative model. 
 
of hogs sold via spot markets and marketing contracts.7 The results (not presented here, but 
available from the authors on request) also support transaction cost and risk motives for 
contract use. For contract use, SPECIFIC GENETICS is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively, in the transaction cost and unified models, while IRAP is significant at the 10% 
level for the risk behavior model only. For spot market use, SPECIFIC GENETICS is signifi-
cant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in the transaction cost and unified models, while 
IRAP is significant at the 1% level in both the risk behavior and unified models. The 
similarity in findings emerges primarily because most of the producers who use marketing 
contracts sell their entire production through the outlet. 
 Finally, the results of nonnested J-tests of relative model performance (cf., Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1981) are presented in table 6. Statistically significant test statistics warrant 
rejection of the hypothesized base model due to significant additional information provided 
by the alternative model. As J-tests tend to reject the null too often, we employ the 5% level of 
significance as a conservative standard. Results for binary and continuous specifications of 
CONTRACT suggest that the transaction cost model outperforms the risk behavior model, but 
the transaction cost and unified models are not discernibly different. This finding is consistent 
with McFadden’s R2 and the proportion of observations correctly predicted. For SPOT the 
results are less direct, but informative. For the binary specification, the transaction cost model 
is rejected in favor of the risk behavior model. For the continuous specification, tests indicate 
both models are incomplete, and that the unified model is a superior representation. The 
transaction cost model is rejected at the 1% level in favor of the unified model. The unified 
model is also superior to the nested risk behavior model, since SPECIFIC GENETICS is 
                                                 
7 See Hobbs (1997) and Kosarek, Garcia, and Morris (2001) for examples of two-limit tobit estimation. The procedure is appropriate for 
continuous dependent variables that, like our data, have many observations at extreme values (i.e., fat tails). 
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statistically significant in the unreported results for the unified model. Intuitively, these 
results suggest that a unified framework can be more informative, particularly in explaining 
spot market use (i.e., the non-use of both marketing contracts associated with specific 
investments and short-term contracts limiting exposure to price risk). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Previous research has offered risk avoidance and/or transaction costs minimization explana-
tions for U.S. hog industry structure, with little empirical support. Here, we examine factors 
influencing the marketing arrangements of hog producers participating in a farm management 
association at the University of Illinois, and verify the relevance of risk behavior and 
transaction costs theories using a unified framework. Overall, our findings reveal that the 
unified framework performs as well as or better than separate risk behavior and transaction 
cost frameworks. 
 By incorporating a more explicit treatment of risk preferences within the transaction cost 
framework, we find that risk preferences and investments in assets tailored for a specific 
exchange relationship are significant predictors of marketing arrangements. Our findings for 
Pennings and Wansink’s (2004) interaction of risk attitudes and risk perceptions variable 
(IRAP) suggest that, consistent with risk behavior theory (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971), 
producers who are more averse to price risk and perceive more of it are more likely to select 
contracting over spot sales. Failure by Davis and Gillespie (2007) to identify a risk attitude 
effect likely reflects their focus on investment rather than price risk. 
 Consistent with transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975), producers’ investments in 
human capital and hog genetics that are specific to the relationship with their primary buyer 
also are positively (negatively) related to their use of marketing contracts (spot markets). 
However, no support was found for such investments in physical assets or site specificity. As 
observed by Ménard and Klein (2004), site specificity may be less important than in the 
poultry industry, because hogs can be transported further without losing value. The general 
agreement of our results with the efficiency-based predictions of transaction cost economics 
further supports Muth’s (2007) testimony to policy makers that the livestock industry is 
operating efficiently. 
 The influences of asset specificity and risk preferences identified here fit with trends of 
market coordination in response to growing segments of consumers with particular tastes and 
dietary concerns. Coordination of production practices and genetics among hog producers 
helps processors source certain carcass attributes needed to serve these segments with differ-
entiated retail pork products. In return, producers may expect a premium or price protection in 
the form of a long-term contract. Alternatively, coordination may be achieved and producers 
may be insulated from price variation through employment in vertically integrated firms. 
Ideally, a multinomial logit model could be used to examine the full spectrum of marketing 
arrangements. 
 Given a limited sample of 48 hog producers using marketing contracts, forward contracts, 
futures and options, and spot sales, we creatively offer insights for a portion of the spectrum 
of marketing arrangements by analyzing both contract and spot dependent variables. Thereby, 
we ascertain the relative importance of risk and transaction cost considerations for long- and 
short-term contracts, relative to spot transactions. Our results suggest that both aspects are 
relevant, but the transaction costs associated with specialized investments are relatively more 
important for long-term marketing contracts, whereas risk aversion has a greater impact on 
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spot market use for which short-term forward contracts and futures and options are other 
alternatives. While both theories appear to be incomplete representations of commodity 
marketing, combining aspects from each offers a richer understanding. 
 Despite a limited sample size, we identify significant effects using a unique combination 
of accounting data and survey data. The use of factor analysis (Hair et al., 1995) to construct 
reliable measures of risk behavior and transaction costs variables from survey items contri-
butes to this success, as does the use of complementary accounting data to accurately control 
for the size and leverage of each hog operation. In comparison, many previous hog marketing 
studies rely solely on self-reported survey data which are sometimes considered less reliable 
than hard data. Given our focus on the use of marketing contracts and spot sales by Illinois 
producers in a farm management association, future research may investigate whether the 
influences of risk preferences and asset specificity extend to the rest of the industry, 
particularly for other regions of hog production and other marketing arrangements. Our 
findings may be applicable to other agricultural markets as well. New asset-specific technolo-
gies and producers’ perceptions and attitudes regarding market risk seem likely candidates to 
explain differences across commodity marketing channels. Future research using a multi-
commodity context and longitudinal data may permit a clearer understanding of the factors 
affecting marketing arrangements and the usefulness of the unified conceptual framework 
presented here. 
 
[Received December 2008; final revision received May 2009.] 
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